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The Effect of School Type on Academic Achievement: Evidence from Indonesia 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using data from Indonesia, this paper evaluates the impact of school type on academic 
achievement of junior secondary school students (grades 7-9).  Students that graduate 
from public junior secondary schools, controlling for a variety of other characteristics, 
score 0.15 to 0.3 standard deviations higher on the national exit exam than comparable 
privately-schooled peers. This finding is robust to OLS, fixed-effects, and instrumental 
variable estimation strategies.  Students attending Muslim private schools, including 
Madrassahs, fare no worse on average than students attending secular priva te schools.  
Our results provide indirect evidence that higher quality inputs at public junior secondary 
schools promote higher test scores.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The existing evidence on how the characteristics of schools in developing 
economies, including whether they are publicly or privately administered, affect students’ 
acquisition of cognitive skills is surprisingly mixed. The effect of educational policies in 
general on learning in developing countries is poorly understood, as a recent survey on 
the topic conceded that “most of what has been learned has been methodological” rather 
than substantive (Glewwe, 2002). Better understanding of the effect of school 
characteristics on learning is important because public policy can influence the 
characteristics of public schools, as well as the cost of private schools through vouchers 
and scholarships. As the first step towards understanding the determinants of student 
achievement in Indonesia, this paper focuses on how the type of school attended by 
junior secondary school students influences their academic achievement.   
This study presents evidence that Indonesian public junior secondary schools are 
more effective than their private counterparts at imparting cognitive skills, as measured 
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by students’ scores on the national test administered upon completion of junior secondary 
school.  We present a model in which households select a school type based on their 
wealth and preference for academic achievement, which raises the prospect of selection 
bias in empirical estimates of the effect of school type on test scores. Our empirical 
results, however, suggest that after controlling for a large number of household 
characteristics, selection bias due to parental preference for achievement is small. OLS, 
fixed effects, and instrumental variables estimation methods indicate that public school 
students have significantly higher exit scores than their privately schooled peers. We find 
no evidence that private schools are more effective than public schools at raising test 
scores.  
We also examine the relative performance of Madrassah, Muslim non-Madrassah, 
secular, and other religious schools, and find two tiers of performance. Students attending 
public schools and the small number of students attending non-Muslim religious private 
schools perform equally well, while students in secular and Muslim private schools each 
fare worse by the same magnitude.  In general, existing studies show that public junior 
secondary schools appear to employ higher quality inputs. Our results therefore provide 
indirect evidence that the higher quality of public school inputs promotes higher test 
scores. Future research will hopefully lead to a better understanding of why public 
schools outperform their private counterparts, by identifying the specific characteristics 
of schools that explain this disparity.  
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BACKGROUND 
 
Notwithstanding the Asian crisis in 1997-1998, schooling in Indonesia has been 
characterized by rapid development since independence in 1945.  Elementary school 
enrollment increased steadily since the early 1970s, when it was around 76 percent, to 
being nearly universal by 1995 (Ahuja and Filmer, 1996).  This was fueled by a major 
expansion of the availability of elementary schools in the early 1970s.  While also 
increasing in this period, enrollment rates at the junior secondary (grades 7-9) and senior 
secondary (grades 10-12) levels remain at 75 to 80 percent.  More recently, despite the 
Asian financial crisis that hit Indonesia in late 1997 and early 1998, enrollment rates at all 
levels were unchanged between 1997 and 2000 (see results in Pradhan, 2001, and Strauss 
et al., 2004, drawn from two different sets of household surveys).  
 In Indonesia, focusing on junior secondary schools is appropriate for several 
reasons. The universal enrollment achieved at the elementary level makes the junior 
secondary level a focal point for efforts to increase school attainment in Indonesia and 
achieve compulsory junior secondary education.  At the same time, there are on-going 
efforts aimed at decentralizing decision-making in the education system, devolving 
authority from the centralized system to the district (kabupaten) level.  Policy-makers at 
the district level, in the presence of grant money, can benefit from studies that shed light 
on which school types are effective.  In addition, a better understanding of the 
determinants of junior high school outcomes can also inform efforts to raise senior 
secondary enrollment levels, since these outcomes presumably influence continuation to 
and eventual graduation from senior secondary schools. 
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The Indonesia context is interesting in that it is atypical of the general consensus 
in the literature that private schools are better (see evidence on academic performance in, 
for example, Angrist et al, 2002, Cox and Jimenez, 1991, Evans and Schwab, 1995, 
Jimenez et al., 1991, Neal, 1997).  In Indonesia, evidence on inputs, as well as limited 
information on per pupil expenditures, is consistent with longstanding perception of the 
superiority of public schools over private schools.  In terms of schooling inputs, Strauss 
et al. (2004) and Serrato and Melnick (1995) generally point to higher quality inputs in 
public schools, although private schools appear superior on two indicators.  Private 
schools offered lower student-teacher ratios in 1997 and 2000, and total household 
expenditures on school fees and other schooling costs were higher for private school 
students.  Nonetheless, for the bulk of observed inputs, public schools look stronger.  
Textbooks appear to be more available in public junior secondary schools than in private 
ones, including textbooks that are borrowed or given for free.  The average faculty 
education at the junior secondary level is higher at public schools than private.  At public 
schools, teachers are significantly less likely to have a second job.  Until they were 
abolished in 1998, public school fees were actually higher than private fees on average.  
Finally, there is limited evidence that public secular junior secondary schools have higher 
funding per pupil (Asian Development Bank, 1997).  Unfortunately, further data 
regarding school financing are unavailable, making it impossible to evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of different school types.  Overall, the weight of the evidence from past 
research indicates that public schools use higher quality inputs. 
Although public schools appear to use better inputs, two previous studies 
conclude that in Indonesia, private schools are more effective and better-managed than 
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public schools.  James et al. (1996) find that, after controlling for exiting test scores, 
private elementary schools in Indonesia incur lower costs per pupil.  They conclude that 
private management is more efficient at achieving academic quality.  A more recent study 
goes further, and claims that students schooled at private secular secondary schools enjoy 
a wage premium of 75 percent over their publicly schooled peers (Bedi and Garg, 2000).  
However, neither study uses a plausibly exogenous source of variation to identify the 
private school effect.  James et al. (1996) identify the effect of school type using the 
religious and demographic composition of its sub-district (kecamatan), which is assumed 
to be orthogonal to schools’ per pupil spending.  Bedi and Garg’s finding that private 
schooling raises future adult earnings is based on the identifying assumption that an 
adult’s province of birth is uncorrelated with the unexplained portion of their earnings.1  
 The implication of this last study, namely that private secular senior secondary 
schools provide a more valuable education than public senior secondary schools, is 
puzzling for two reasons.  First, as noted above, public schools in Indonesia look stronger 
on observed inputs and are widely perceived to be superior to secular and Muslim private 
schools.  Indeed, past studies such as Bedi and Garg (2000) confirm that public and 
private Christian secondary schools attract observably stronger students.  Second, some 
public schools in urban areas screen applicants based on the score of their na tional test 
following elementary school.  Students at these schools benefit from a higher-scoring 
peer group.  The positive effect of private administration would have to  outweigh these 
peer effects, which appear to be important in other contexts (See Hoxby, 2000, and 
Somers et al., 2003).  
                                                 
1 The finding in our study  that selection bias is small with respect to the effect of school type on junior 
high school exam scores does not imply that selection bias was not present in these two studies, which used 
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MODEL 
 
This section presents a simple model in which two countervailing sources of 
selection bias may occur.  Because public secondary schools appear to be superior to 
private secondary schools in Indonesia, past work has focused on the potential for 
positive selection of the best students into public secondary schools (Bedi and Garg, 
2000).  While the perceived higher quality of public schools is one source of bias, a 
second source derives from wealthier households’ preference for private schools, ceteris 
paribus.  
 Consider a two period model in which a parent selects a school in period 1. The 
parent’s utility function is assumed to be concave and increasing in each period’s 
consumption, and an increasing function of the student’s academic performance at the 
end of period 1. The parent’s utility is also assumed to be an increasing function of non-
academic features of the school (such as its safety or proximity). The child returns a 
portion of their income to the parent in period 2, which is consumed. We assume the 
parent’s utility from the child’s attending school j takes the following simple functional 
form:2   
 
(1)  ( ) ( ) jjjjj OAAYPYU gskd ++++-= 21 lnln . 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
different dependent variables and a smaller set of control variables.   
2 The exact form of the utility function does not affect the results derived below, as long as utility is 
concave in consumption.    
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tY  represents the household income in period t, which is exogenous with respect 
to their choice of school type. Pj is the tuition of school j, and d is the parent’s discount 
rate. Aj represents the student’s academic achievement at the end of period 1, after 
attending school j, which enters the parent’s utility function directly if s is non-zero.  The 
household’s valuation of academic achievement is captured by s , net of income gains 
associated with that achievement.  Meanwhile, jAk  represents the transfer from the child 
to the parent in period two, which is assumed to be proportional to the academic ability of 
the student.  Finally, Oj represents other, non-academic characteristics of the school, such 
as safety, religious affiliation, convenience, and discipline, that are valued by parents for 
more than their contribution to academic achievement.   
For simplicity, academic performance (school outcome) is assumed to be a 
positive and linear function of three factors: the quality of the school (Qj), the parent’s 
income in period 1 (Y1), and the degree to which parents directly value academic 
performance (s ). 
 
(2)  sbaYQA jj ++= 1 , 
 
We assume that parents who have higher income and value education more will 
provide a household environment more conducive to learning, meaning that the 
parameters a and b are positive. In addition, we assume for simplicity that s, which 
measures a parent’s taste for education, is positive and that household income Yt  is 
greater than tuition Pj, for all schools j.  
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 Because public schools are generally considered to be superior on average to 
private schools in Indonesia, we assume that pub priQ Q> . However, the set of schools 
which a child can attend is typically constrained by the location of the household, and in 
some cases, by the child’s score on the national test for elementary school graduates (the 
Ebtanas test score).  These constraints, along with other non-academic characteristics of 
the school Oj, may lead parents to choose a private school even if higher quality public 
schools exist.  The child attends public school if the maximum utility of the set of pub lic 
schools they can attend, U*pub , exceeds the maximum utility of the set of private schools 
they can attend U*pri.  
The difference in utilities between the best available public school and the best 
available private option is:  
 
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 1 2 2ln ln ln lnpub pri pub priU Y P Y P Y A Y Ad k d kD = - - - + + - + +   
 
( ) ( )pub pri pub priA A O Os g- + - .  
 
Appendix A shows that, under the assumption that Ppri > Ppub:  
 
(4)  
*
0
Ud
ds
D
> , and 
 
(5)  
1
*
0
U
Y
d
d
D
< . 
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This model confirms the intuition a parent that places higher value on education is 
more likely to send their child to public schools, which are assumed to be of higher 
average quality. Meanwhile, holding other factors constant, the likelihood of attending 
private school increases as the household’s wealth increases.  In the U.S., where private 
schools are generally considered to be higher quality, wealthier and more motivated 
students select into private schools.  In Indonesia, however, where in general public 
schools are considered to be of higher quality, the two sources of selection bias are of 
opposite sign. Thus, the direction and magnitude of bias in the OLS models is unknown, 
and depends on the relative strength of unmeasured wealth and unmeasured motivation, 
as well as the importance of these factors in determining students’ test score.   
 
DATA 
 
The primary data source for this study is the three full rounds of the Indonesia 
Family Life Survey (IFLS1, IFLS2, and IFLS3) (see Frankenberg and Karoly, 1995; 
Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000; Strauss et al., 2004).   The first round of the survey 
sampled 7,200 households in 1993; subsequent surveys attempted to re- interview these 
households and households to which previous household members had relocated since 
the original interview (“split-off” households). The 1993 sample was drawn from 321 
randomly selected villages, spread among 13 Indonesian provinces containing 83 percent 
of the country’s two hundred million people. The 321 villages were selected from the 
sample frame of the 1993 SUSENAS, the national economic survey, and are located in 
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149 districts. The sample captures an impressive amount of Indonesia’s remarkable 
ethnic and geographic diversity.  
We analyze the national Ebtanas test scores of former junior secondary school 
students.  Data on test scores was collected in 1997 and 2000 from all household 
members between the ages of 14 and 25 at the time of the interview. The survey asked 
respondents to state their score on the test, if they took the exam, for the elementary, 
junior, and senior secondary school levels.  The survey also ascertained the type of school 
attended at each level.  
The sample consists of all students who reported, in either 1997 or 2000, taking 
the junior secondary school test between 1990 and 2000. Of the 5,608 respondents that 
reported taking the national junior secondary school exam between 1990 and 2000, 4,498 
reported scores from both elementary and junior secondary schools.  An additional 115 
respondents were not included in the sample because they did not report the type or 
district of the junior secondary school they attended, leaving a final sample consisting of 
4,383 respondents. 
 This study also uses data on the presence of private schools, at both the district 
and the village level, to identify the effect of school type on student’s test score.  District-
level data on the presence of schools come from the 1998 round of annual census of 
schools conducted by the Indonesian Ministry of Education. Eighty percent of the 42,000 
secondary schools in Indonesia responded to this survey.  Unfortunately, because of a 
budgetary shortfall during the 1998 financial crisis, the education census did not record 
detailed data on the characteristics of private schools. The only information recorded for 
private schools were their private status and location. This information is used to 
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construct both the total number of junior secondary schools and the percentage of district 
junior secondary schools that are public in the district.  
We obtain village- level data on the percentage of schools that are private using  
the 2000 IFLS, which like earlier IFLS rounds contains a complete roster of 
neighborhood schools. This roster contains the schools that household members report 
attending, as well as schools identified by community leaders but which are not attended 
by the sample of survey households in the community. These community leaders were 
not asked to provide information regarding the school type, however. Therefore, we 
inferred the public or private status of schools listed on the roster, using the school 
name.3  
As a first step towards investigating how a student’s test score is affected by the 
type of junior secondary school, Figure 1 shows students’ test scores exiting junior high 
schools, smoothed against their test scores exiting elementary school, separately for 
public and private junior high students.  In Figure 1 and throughout the paper, students’ 
test scores are normalized using the scores of other students that took the national test in 
the same year. The shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals. Conditional on 
elementary test scores, students at public junior secondary schools score higher upon 
exiting junior secondary school.  Moreover, the difference in exiting test scores appears 
to be greatest for students at the tails of the elementary test score distribution.   
To further probe this initial finding, we control for other observed child and 
family characteristics in a regression framework.  Including control variables, however, 
                                                 
3 Public junior secondary schools in Indonesia are typically assigned a registration number. Therefore, any 
school name containing the Indonesian acronym for junior secondary school (SMP) followed by a number 
is designated as public. In addition, a school was also considered to be public if its name identified it as a 
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requires making a trade-off between the size of the sample and the availability of 
particular household characteristics. Because test scores are provided retrospectively, 
many respondents first appeared in an IFLS household several years after their graduation 
from junior secondary school. For these respondents, time-varying househo ld 
characteristics such as household consumption are not observed at the time they took the 
test.  Excluding these time-varying household characteristics may confound estimates of 
the effect of junior secondary school type on test score. Therefore, we also present results 
for two sub-samples.  The junior secondary school sample consists of 2,733 respondents 
who were interviewed within a year of their junior secondary school graduation. 4 When 
this sample is used, the time-varying characteristics which are measured within a year of 
taking the exam are included as control variables. The elementary school sample consists 
of 1,948 students who are in the junior secondary school sample and were also 
interviewed in a previous round of the survey. For these respondents, time-varying 
characteristics such as household consumption are available both before and after the 
student’s entry into junior secondary school.  To ensure that omission of time-varying 
variables does not affect the results, we present results for all three samples throughout. 
                                                                                                                                                 
public Madrassah (MTSN) or public technical school (SLTPN), or if its name contained the word “public” 
(negara or negeri).  
4 The junior secondary sample consists of students who took the test in 1999 or 2000 and were interviewed 
in 2000, students who took the test between 1996 and 1998 and were interviewed in 1997, and students 
who took the test between 1992 and 1994 and were interviewed in 1993. The elementary school sample 
consists of students in the junior secondary sample that were also interviewed in a previous survey round.  
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Figure 1 
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Regressions using the full sample include, as control variables, a set of time-
invariant characteristics of the respondent:   
· Academic achievement in elementary school: The (normalized) student’s 
reported elementary school test score and its square, and whether the student 
repeated a grade in elementary school.   
· District characteristics: The average normalized elementary school test score 
of all other students that attended school in that district, and the number of 
total schools in the district.5  
                                                 
5 The average elementary school test score for a particular district is constructed by averaging the 
elementary test score of all other respondents that attended junior secondary school in the same district. For 
sixteen students in the full sample, no other respondent attended junior secondary school in their district, 
and the single student’s test score was used as the average.  
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· Family background: Parental education level, the family’s religion, and the 
primary language spoken at home (as a proxy for ethnic background which is 
not directly recorded). 
· Location characteristics: The province in which the student attended junior 
secondary school and whether the town in which the respondent lived at age 
12 was a village, a small town, or a big city.    
· Type of elementary school: The type of elementary school attended (public 
secular, public Madrassah, private secular, private Madrassah, private Muslim 
non-Madrassah, or private other)  
· Student characteristics: Whether the respondent is female, and whether the 
respondent worked while attending junior secondary school.  
· Type of junior secondary school: Whether the junior secondary school 
attended was a vocational school, and the type of junior secondary school 
attended (public secular, public Madrassah, private secular, private 
Madrassah, private Muslim non-Madrassah, or private other) 
 Regressions that use the junior secondary school sample include the following three 
time-varying characteristics of the household: 
· Household income/wealth: Household per capita expenditure and type of floor 
in the dwelling. 
· Student health: General health status (healthy, somewhat healthy, or 
unhealthy).6  
                                                 
6 This question was not asked in 1993 and is therefore only available for half of the sample. Missing 
observations are grouped as a separate category.  
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The elementary school sub-sample adds the same time-varying characteristics as 
the junior secondary school sub-sample, measured two to four years before the 
completion of junior secondary school. 7 The means and standard errors of the full set of 
covariates are presented in Appendix B.  
To check the quality of the data on test scores and household characteristics, we 
regressed the student’s normalized test score on the variables listed above, using the 
junior secondary school sub-sample and variables.  The results, which are presented in 
Appendix C, are encouraging.  The model explains nearly half of the total variation in 
test scores, and the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are reasonable.  Academic 
performance in elementary school and higher levels of parental education are associated 
with higher test scores in junior secondary school. 8   
 
DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL TYPE  
 
 Before turning to the question of how school type affects academic performance, 
we first examine the relationship between a student’s characteristics and the type of 
school she chooses. While the determinants of school type are of interest in their own 
right, they may also provide some guidance to the extent and nature of selection bias due 
to unobserved student characteristics. Public schools, which are generally considered to 
be superior to private schools in Indonesia, may attract more motivated students. 
However, holding constant other characteristics of the household and schools, higher 
household wealth should raise the probability that children attend private schools. To 
                                                 
7 For elementary school students, general health status is reported by the mother or primary caregiver.  
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examine the effect of household wealth and student academic ability on the type of 
school attended, we use the junior secondary school sample to estimate a multinomial 
logit regression of school type attendance. The dependent variable is an indicator of 
whether the student attended public school, private secular school, private Muslim-
affiliated school, private Madrassah, or a private non-Muslim religious school. 9  There 
are few students attending private non-Muslim religious schools; these schools include 
Christian and Catholic private schools that are considered to be of comparable quality to 
public schools.10    Therefore, we focus on the determinants of attendance at private 
secular, Muslim-affiliated private schools, and Madrassahs. The entire set of household 
and student characteristics listed in the data section are included as control variables, but 
we report only the results from indicators of household wealth, the student’s prior 
academic achievement and parental education. Table 1 reports the marginal effects of 
each variable on the probability of attending a particular type of school, and whether the 
variable was statistically significant in the multinomial logit model.  For dummy 
variables, the marginal effect is the sample average of the difference in the predicted 
probabilities when the dummy variable is set to one or zero.   For the test score and 
consumption variables, we report the average of each observation’s marginal effects of 
the variable and its square.  For these variables, the significance of the variable and its 
square were tested jointly.   
                                                                                                                                                 
8 The coefficients on the province dummies are as high as one standard deviation. These substantial 
provincial differences, which we do not attempt to explain, may be the topic of future research.  
9 In this analysis, public Madrassahs are grouped with public secular schools for brevity. Only 7% of public 
school students attend public Madrassahs.     
10  Three percent of the full sample and ten percent of the private-school attendees attend non-Muslim 
religious schools.   Of these schools, about 60 percent of this category are Catholic schools, while the 
remaining 40 percent are Christian, Buddhist, or other religious affiliation.  Christian schools are not 
restricted to Christian students.  Private Catholic and Protestant secondary schools often enroll Muslim 
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The regression contains two measures of income or wealth: household per capita 
consumption and the floor type of the house. After controlling for a wide variety of other 
household characteristics, these indicators of income and wealth are weak determinants 
of the type of junior secondary school attended.  The marginal effect of log household per 
capita consumption (-0.012) for private secular shows that a ten percent increase in 
household per capita consumption lowers the probability of attendance relative to public 
school by one tenth of a percentage point. Meanwhile, despite the theory that increased 
wealth increases the probability of private school attendance ceteris-paribus, there is no 
consistent pattern between the quality of the floor and the probability of attending private 
secular or Muslim school.    
 The student’s past academic performance has a larger effect on the probability of 
attending private school. An increase in the elementary school exam score of one 
standard deviation lowers the probability of attending private secular school by nine 
percentage points; the probability of attending private Muslim school falls by seven 
percentage points, and the probability of attending a private Madrassah falls by one 
percentage point.  Grade repetition in elementary school also reduces in the probability of 
attending a secular private school, although this effect is smaller and not statistically 
significant.  Likewise, parental education is generally not a strong determinant of school 
type.  Although the children of university-educated mothers are about 6 percentage points 
less likely to attend private secular school or Muslim schools, these coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Parental education is presumably correlated with student 
motivation and, in results presented later, is shown to be a strong predictor of junior 
                                                                                                                                                 
students.  In the data used, very few students switched schools at all, let alone switched between public and 
private schools, during their attendance at the junior secondary level. 
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secondary school test score. The relatively small effect of parental education suggests 
that after controlling for lagged test scores, there may not be a large difference in student 
motivation at different types of schools.  
To sum up, household wealth has a weak, if any, discernable effect on the 
household’s choice of school type. Students with higher elementary school test scores are 
less likely to attend secular and Muslim private school. This confirms the widespread 
impression that public schools in Indonesia tend to benefit from positive selection. If 
selection on unobservable characteristics is similar to selection on observables, the effect 
of selection of better students into public schools likely outweighs the selection of 
wealthier students into private schools. If so, the estimated effects of public school 
attendance on test scores will be biased upward. The next section turns to examining 
estimates of the effect of public schooling on test scores.   
 
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLING ON TEST SCORES  
 
Are public or private schools, on average, more effective at raising the test scores 
of Indonesian junior secondary school students? To address this question, we regressed 
the respondents’ normalized junior secondary test score on the control variables 
described above, with school type represented by a dummy variable for public school 
attendance. To conserve space, only the coefficient on school type is shown. Column one 
of Table 2 indicates that public school students, in the presence of controls, score 0.19 
standard deviations higher than private school students.  The second specification 
includes time-varying control variables measured within a year of junior high graduation, 
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which are only available for the junior secondary school sub-sample. The estimated 
public school effect, which is reported in column two, increases to 0.23 standard 
deviations in this specification. When time-varying variables measured around the 
student’s elementary school graduation are added, the magnitude of the premium rises 
slightly, to 0.27 standard deviations  (Column three).  The final specification (Column 
four) includes family- level fixed effects, which identifies the public school effect using 
siblings that attended different types of schools, and the estimated public school premium 
is 0.24 standard deviations. 11 After controlling for a wide variety of student and parent 
characteristics, regression estimates indicate that, on average, public school students have 
test scores are 0.19 to 0.27 standard deviations higher than private schools students.   
Of course, least squares estimates of the public school effect will be biased if 
public school attendance is correlated with unobserved factors that determine test scores. 
In the Indonesian context, the direction of this endogeneity bias is unclear in theory, as 
described above. However, the correlation between observable characteristics and school 
choice suggests that public schools benefit from positive selection, biasing the estimated 
public school premium upward.  Moreover, because parents choose schools separately for 
each child within the household, partly on the basis of unobservable child characteristics, 
the inclusion of family- level fixed effects does not eliminate this bias.   
To address concerns regarding bias due to non-random sorting of students into 
different types of schools, we estimate two-stage-least-squares models of test scores, 
employing measures of the local availability of public schools as an instrument for public 
school attendance.  This approach has been used to estimate the effect of Catholic 
                                                 
11 Results of the fixed effects estimation strategy are not reported for the junior secondary school and 
elementary sub-samples, because there is little variation within family in the time -varying variables that are 
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schooling effect in the United States (see, for example, Neal, 1997, and Figlio and 
Ludwig, 2000).  The importance of availability of private schools in schooling choices 
has been demonstrated in the developing country context (see, for example, Alderman et 
al., 2001).   
Data on the presence of public and private schools are available at both the district 
and the village level.  These two measures are moderately correlated, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.33.  Using district- level information, we measure the percentage of 
schools that are public in the district of junior high school attendance.  For the sample of 
students from the 321 original IFLS communities, we can measure the share of public 
schools within 25 miles of the village center.  This latter specification can only be 
estimated on the sample of students that were interviewed in the same sub-district where 
they attended junior secondary school.12 
The consistency of the two stage least squares estimate is based on the critical 
assumption that local private school proximity is uncorrelated with unobserved 
determinants of student test scores.  This assumption has been questioned in the US 
context, where evidence suggests that proximity to catholic high schools is correlated 
with unobserved determinants of 12th grade math and reading test scores (Altonji, Elders, 
and Taber 2002).   However, that conclusion is largely based on the implausibly large 
differences between OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of Catholic schooling on 
scores, which we do not find in the Indonesia data.  Also, the location of American 
                                                                                                                                                 
included in these sub-samples.  
12 In principle, considering only students that remained in the same sub-district that that they attended 
junior secondary school could cause selection bias. To probe this, we utilized the fact that student’s test 
scores are ranked based on their deviations from annual means, and estimated a Heckman two step model 
excluding the year the test was taken from the test score equation. The estimated public school premium 
remained essentially the same in the presence of the selection correction term, even though the years since 
the test was taken was strongly and positively correlated with whether the student had subsequently moved.   
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Catholic high schools is heavily influenced by historical pattern of past Catholic 
migration (Hoxby, 1994), implying that the positive correlation between student 
unobservables and  proximity to American Catholic high schools does not generalize to 
Indonesian private middle schools.   
 We note three additional factors that increase the plausibility of the identifying 
assumption that proximity to public schools is uncorrelated with unobserved determinants 
of test scores.  First, the direction of bias due to endogenous school location decisions is 
unknown.   Second, the correlation between the public school access instruments and the 
observed determinants of test scores is weak and negative.  Finally, the correlation 
between public school access instruments and a proxy for unobserved student motivation 
is also weak, and in one case negative.   
In contrast to OLS and fixed effects regressions, where selection bias likely leads 
to an overestimate of the public school premium, it is not clear how the location decisions 
of public and private schools will bias the estimated public school effect. If public 
schools are spread uniformly throughout a population that is heterogeneous in its demand 
for education, then profit-maximizing private schools will locate in areas where demand 
for education, and therefore student achievement, is higher.  In this case, the estimated 
public school premium will be biased downward.  This downward bias may be mitigated 
or reversed by two factors.  First, the national education department may maximize 
educational achievement by locating public schools in areas with high students ability 
(for an example of endogenous program placement, see Pitt et al., 1993).  Second, the 
estimated public school effect could be upwardly biased if private and/or Muslim schools 
are more appealing to parents living in areas with undisciplined students.  Concerns 
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regarding endogenous school placement are lessened to the extent that schools locate 
based on characteristics of the population that are included in the model, such as average 
district- level and student- level test scores.  Nonetheless, theory provides no clear 
guidance as to whether private schools are more common in areas with unobservably 
stronger or weaker students.  
To gain some empirical insight into the location decisions of public and private 
schools and possible bias in the 2SLS estimates, we regressed the district and village 
measure of public school access on the all observed determinants of test scores. The 
results for a subset of regression coefficients are reported in table 3.  The correlation 
between public school availability and observed elementary school academic 
achievement is weak, and if anything, negative.  The coefficients on the district 
elementary test score and its square indicate that raising the district test score two 
standard deviations from the mean is associated with a 3.7 point reduction in the 
percentage of public schools in the district.   At the village level, the negative relationship 
is stronger, as raising districts with scores that are two standard deviations higher than the 
mean is associated with a 30 point reduction in the percentage of public schools.  The 
percentage of public schools is positively, though weakly, correlated with the education 
of the parents.  If the weakly negative correlation between academic achievement and the 
percentage of public schools extends to unobserved determinants of test scores, the two-
stage least squares estimates of the public school premium will be downwardly biased.  
In the case of the village- level instruments, it may be substantially biased downwards.13  
                                                 
13 In addition to selection on type of school conditional on attending, there may be selection in school 
attendance.  Since we condition on completed primary schooling (the vast majority of which is public), this 
pertains to students    
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Finally, we conduct an informal check to see if the mild negative correlation 
between the instruments and the observed determinants of achievement extends to a 
proxy for student motivation.  In 1997, The IFLS asked students to report the amount of 
hours they spent studying at home during junior high.  Of course, home study time 
partially reflects the quality of a particular school type, so this variable is omitted from 
the test score regressions.  However, the number of hours spent studying at home partly 
reflects student motivation entering junior high school.  To examine the potential for 
inconsistency in the instrumental variable estimates, we reestimate the regression 
reported in table 3 for students interviewed in 1997, adding a public junior high school 
dummy and the number of hours spent studying at home (results not presented here).  The 
coefficient on study hours suggests whether, conditional on other observables and a 
public school dummy, more diligent students live in areas with higher public school 
availability.   
The number of hours per week studying at home is weakly associated with public 
school availability.  When the percentage of schools that are public in the district is 
regressed on all the variables in the model plus a public school dummy and study hours 
outside of school, the coefficient on study hours is 0.04 and not statistically significant.  
Thus, studying an additional 15 hours more per week (equal to two standard deviations) 
is associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in district public school availability.   
When the percentage of pulbic schools in the village is used, the coefficient on study 
hours is -0.05.  Therefore, studying an additional 15 hours per week is associated with a 
0.65 percentage point decline in village public school availability.  Overall, these results 
indicate that the availability of public schools is weakly correlated with an important, 
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albeit imperfectly measured, proxy for student motivation.  This reduces the likelihood 
that the local public school availability instruments are spuriously correlated with higher 
test scores through unobserved student motivation.  
Table 4 presents the instrumental variables results. When the district level 
measure of access to private schools is used, the public school premium falls slightly to 
0.19 for the full sample.  The estimated premium rises to 0.31 when the junior secondary 
sample is used, but falls to 0.15 in the elementary school subsample.  None of the 
instrumental variable estimates are statistically significant. The first stage F statistic on 
these instruments ranges from 25 to 37, meaning that finite sample bias due to weak 
instruments is not an important concern. 14 When the village- level presence of private 
schools is used, the results are only estimated for the sub-sample of students that were 
interviewed in the sub-district in which they went to junior secondary school.  In 
comparison to the district access instruments, the estimated public school premium stays 
roughly the same in the full sample and the junior secondary sample, and rises 
dramatically in the elementary school sample.15  The first stage F statistics for the village 
level instrument are all above 22 in these regressions. We discount the results using 
village-level instruments, because these instruments are more strongly correlated with 
measures of academic achievement in Table 3, and more importantly, because the sample 
excludes inter-subdistrict movers.  
Taken as a whole, the results from regressions estimating the average effect of 
public schools on test scores are consistent.  Least squares estimates suggest a public 
                                                 
14 Of course, the estimates will be biased if the instruments are correlated with the test score residual.   
15 The consistency between the district and village instrumental results, given the different patterns of 
correlation with observable academic achievement in Table 3, implies that correlations with observables 
does not extend to correlation with unobservable determinants of test score.    
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school premium which would raise a student’s test score 0.19 to 0.27 standard deviations.  
Using district-level and village level access instruments generally results in similar 
estimated effects, although the effect ranges from 0.15 to 0.41, depending on the sample 
and the instrument.  Because village- level access instruments were only available for a 
selected subsample of non-movers, we view the estimates based on these instruments 
with caution. Nonetheless, the similarity of the magnitudes of the OLS and the district-
level instrumental variable estimates suggest that in total, the endogeneity bias resulting 
from parent’s choice of school type does not invalidate the qualitative conclusions drawn 
from the OLS and fixed-effect estimates. Furthermore, the consistent finding of a positive 
public school premium across all estimation strategies is strong evidence that public 
junior secondary schools, on average, provide superior preparation for the national exam.  
   
DIFFERENT TYPES OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
 
 We now turn to comparing the average effect of attending different types of 
private junior secondary schools on test scores. We regressed students’ normalized score 
on the junior secondary school test on an indicator of school type that distinguishes 
between public Madrassah, private secular, private Madrassah, priva te other Muslim, and 
non-Muslim religious schools, controlling for the student characteristics listed above. 
Because the type of private school cannot be identified using the village data from the 
IFLS or school census data from the Ministry of Education, instruments for this 
regression were unavailable and only OLS and fixed effects results are presented. Table 5 
presents these results. In the full sample, the disadvantage in test scores relative to public 
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school students is one-fourth of a standard deviation for secular private schools and 
private Muslim schools, about 0.10 standard deviations for private Muslim Madrassahs, 
and small and not significant for private other schools. The disadvantage is larger for the 
junior secondary school and elementary school sub-samples. When family- level fixed 
effects are included for the full sample, the disadvantage to private school secular and 
Muslim students rises slightly to about 0.3 standard deviations.  Overall, the results 
suggest that there are two tiers of schools, with private secular and Muslim schools 
lagging behind public schools and other private schools.  
 Is the positive effect of public schooling stronger for brighter students? Table 6 
displays the results from an OLS regression on the full sample in which junior secondary 
school type is interacted with the student’s elementary school test score quartile. For 
students in the highest quintile, secular and Muslim private schooling is associated with a 
-0.40 and a -0.45 reduction test scores, which is statistically significant at the 95% level.  
Meanwhile, for students in the second and lower quartile, the coefficients on school type 
are smaller.  Some public schools in Indonesia, particularly in urban areas, screen 
students based on their elementary school test score.  The results suggests that, relative to 
their privately schooled peers, the brightest public students benefit the most from this 
sorting, while less intelligent public school students are not harmed by it.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEST SCORE  
 
 Finally, we examine a secondary methodological question: How robust is the 
baseline estimated effect of school type if the measures of elementary school 
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achievement are excluded from the model? Table 7 shows the public school premium for 
each sample and methodology, with and without two variables measuring academic 
performance in elementary school: the student’s elementary school test score (and its 
square), and whether the student repeated a grade in elementary school. Excluding these 
elementary school academic performance variables in a standard OLS regression 
generally doubles the public school premium.  Because elementary school performance is 
strongly and positively associated with both public school attendance and subsequent 
junior secondary school test performance, its omission creates substantial upward bias in 
the estimated public school premium.   
  
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper focuses on how junior secondary school students’ choice of school 
type influences their academic achievement.  Students that attended public junior 
secondary schools, controlling for other characteristics, have higher test scores upon 
completion than those who attended private school. This finding is robust to three 
different estimation strategies: OLS, family- level fixed effects, and the use of regional 
measures of access to private schools as instruments for public school attendance. The 
OLS estimates of the public school premium are all statistically significant and in the 
range of 0.20 to 0.25 standard deviations, depending on the specification.  Instrumental 
variable estimates are not statistically significant, but the estimated public school 
premium is generally similar; it ranges from 0.15 to 0.4 standard deviations.   After 
examining different types of public and private schools, two tiers of performance emerge.  
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Students in public school and non-Muslim religious private schools performed better than 
students in Muslim schools and secular private schools.  However, students attending 
public Madrassahs performed no worse than those attending public secular schools, and 
students attending private Madrassahs performed no worse than their counterparts in 
private secular schools. The test score premium for public and non-Muslim religious 
private schools is highest for the brightest students. Finally, not surprisingly, indicators 
for achievement at the elementary school level are important covariates whose absence 
from the model substantially alters the results. 
This research is a first step towards understanding the effects of school type on 
cognitive achievement in Indonesia.  Recognizing the gaps in the existing literature, the 
study assesses the returns to public junior secondary schooling in terms of test scores, in 
light of the general finding that public schools use higher quality inputs. The findings 
raise the interesting observation that despite lower average returns in test scores and 
higher household expenditures, some parents choose to send their children to private 
schools.  Parents may choose private schools because public school enrollment is 
rationed, because they prefer Islamic-based moral and religious instruction, or because 
private schools are perceived to have other non-academic advantages.  Future research 
should examine the importance of these competing explanations. In addition, identifying 
the specific aspects of quality that drive these higher scores will help in understanding 
how and why public school students outperform their privately educated counterparts.
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APPENDIX A 
 
Proof that 
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The household chooses to send their child to a public school if the maximum utility from 
the most desirable public school exceeds the maximum utility from the most desirable 
private school. The difference in utilities between the most desirable public and most 
desirable school is:  
 
(A1)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 1 2 2ln ln ln lnpub pri pub pri pub pri pub priU Y Y Y A Y A A A O Od k d k s gD = - + + - + + - + - . 
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By assumption, Ppri > Ppub, which implies that 1 1
pub priY Y>  
Taking derivatives with respect to s and Y1 gives: 
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Where t can be written as:  
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Substituting t into (A4) and rearranging gives:  
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Equation (2) and the assumptions that a,b,s are positive implies that:  
 
(A7) b < Apub  
 
This inequality, together with the assumptions that Y2 > 1, 0 < d < 1, and A>0, implies 
that:  
 
(A8) dbk < kA + Y2, and  
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(A9) 1 < Y2 + kApri  
 
which means that  
*Ud
ds
D
 is of the same sign as Apub – Apri, which is positive by 
assumption.  
 
Meanwhile, 
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Since 1 1
pub priY Y>  by assumption and Apub > Apri. 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
Sample Means 
 
Academic Achievement in Junior High  School Mean Standard Error 
Junior high test score (normalized) 0.032 (0.029) 
Academic Achievement in Elementary School    
Elementary test score (normalized) 0.055 (0.031) 
Didn't repeat grade* 0.825 (0.009) 
Household wealth  after Junior Secondary School   
Log PCE  3.306 (0.059) 
Tile floor* 0.338 (0.016) 
Cement/Brick floor* 0.364 (0.016) 
Lumber floor* 0.066 (0.009) 
Bamboo floor* 0.004 (0.001) 
Dirt floor* 0.089 (0.012) 
District and village characteristics   
Average district Elementary test score 0.037 (0.023) 
# of schools in district 125.2 (4.208) 
        % of schools public in district 46.4 (0.906) 
        % of schools public in village 55.1 (1.573) 
Parental Characteristics*    
Mom attended junior secondary 0.149 (0.008) 
Mom attended senior secondary 0.126 (0.008) 
Mom attended university 0.031 (0.004) 
Dad attended junior secondary  0.164 (0.008) 
Dad attended senior secondary 0.205 (0.010) 
Dad attended university 0.064 (0.006) 
Christian 0.048 (0.007) 
Catholic 0.017 (0.003) 
Hindu 0.020 (0.005) 
Other 0.007 (0.002) 
Student Characteristics*    
Female respondent 0.506 (0.008) 
Not working in junior secondary 0.932 (0.006) 
Somewhat healthy  0.392 (0.010) 
Somewhat unhealthy  0.031 (0.003) 
Residence at age 12: Small town  0.297 (0.015) 
Residence at age 12: Big city  0.139 (0.012) 
Type of Elementary School*   
Public Madrassah 0.003 (0.001) 
Private Secular 0.031 (0.006) 
Private Muslim, not Madrassah 0.036 (0.005) 
Private Madrassah 0.030 (0.005) 
Private Other 0.028 (0.003) 
 33 
 
Type of Junior Secondary School*   
Vocational junior secondary 0.024 (0.003) 
Public Madrassah 0.043 (0.005) 
Private Secular 0.148 (0.010) 
Private Muslim, not Madrassah 0.081 (0.006) 
Languages spoken at home*   
 Indonesia 0.254 (0.015) 
 Java 0.461 (0.019) 
 Sunda 0.209 (0.014) 
 Bali 0.014 (0.003) 
 Batak 0.018 (0.004) 
 Bugis  0.017 (0.005) 
 Chinese 0.006 (0.002) 
 Madura 0.051 (0.007) 
 Sasak 0.013 (0.003) 
 Minang 0.031 (0.006) 
 Banjar 0.019 (0.004) 
 Bima 0.005 (0.002) 
 Makassar 0.007 (0.003) 
 Nias 0.000 (0.000) 
 Palembang 0.015 (0.005) 
 Sumbawa 0.002 (0.001) 
 Toraja 0.005 (0.003) 
 Lahat 0.003 (0.002) 
 Sumatra selatan 0.021 (0.006) 
 Betawi 0.010 (0.002) 
 Lampung 0.002 (0.001) 
Location of Junior Secondary School*    
North Sumatra  0.047 (0.008) 
West Sumatra  0.034 (0.008) 
South Sumatra  0.047 (0.009) 
Lampung  0.041 (0.011) 
West Java  0.215 (0.023) 
Central Java  0.198 (0.024) 
Yogyakarta  0.036 (0.006) 
East Java  0.209 (0.024) 
Bali  0.020 (0.005) 
West Nusa Tenggara  0.018 (0.004) 
South Kalimantan  0.016 (0.004) 
South Sulawesi  0.032 (0.008) 
Other Province  0.002 (0.001) 
* This is a binary variable, equal to 1 if true, else equal to 0. 
 
 
 34 
APPENDIX C 
 
Determinants of junior secondary school test score 
 
Academic achievement in elementary school  
Elementary test score 0.44** 
Elementary test score, squared 0.08** 
Didn't repeat grade 0.23** 
Household wealth  after junior secondary school  
Log PCE after junior secondary  0.001 
Log PCE after junior secondary, squared (/1000)  0.02 
Tile floor -0.05 
Cement/Brick floor -0.07 
Lumber floor -0.25* 
Bamboo floor 0.05 
Dirt floor -0.15 
District characteristics  
Average district Elementary score 0.04 
Average district Elementary score,  squared  -0.021 
# of schools in district 0.001* 
Parental characteristics  
Mom attended junior secondary -0.02 
Mom attended senior secondary 0.09 
Mom attended university 0.27* 
Dad attended junior secondary  0.08 
Dad attended senior secondary 0.16** 
Dad attended university 0.33** 
Christian 0.04 
Catholic 0.05 
Hindu 0.21 
Other 0.02 
Student characteristics  
Female respondent -0.02 
Not working in junior secondary 0.09 
Somewhat healthy  -0.05 
Somewhat unhealthy  -0.17* 
Residence at age 12: Small town  0.03 
Residence at age 12: Big city  -0.09 
Type of elementary school  
Public Madrassah -0.15 
Private Secular 0.17 
Private Muslim, not Madrassah 0.20** 
Private Madrassah 0.21* 
Private Other 0.30* 
Type of junior secondary school  
Vocational junior secondary -0.48** 
Public Madrassah -0.05 
Private Secular -0.24** 
Private Muslim, not Madrassah -0.32** 
Private Madrassah -0.24** 
Private Other 0.02 
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Languages spoken at home   
 Indonesia 0.02 
 Java 0.11 
 Sunda 0.02 
 Bali 0.06 
 Batak -0.39** 
 Bugis  -0.04 
 Chinese 0.46* 
 Madura -0.04 
 Sasak 0.03 
 Minang 0.05 
 Banjar 0.07 
 Bima 0.13 
 Makassar -0.77* 
 Nias 0.000 
 Palembang -0.03 
 Sumbawa -0.26 
 Toraja -0.44 
 Lahat -0.41* 
 Sumatra selatan -0.09 
 Betawi 0.11 
 Lampung -0.34 
Location of junior secondary school   
North Sumatra  0.36** 
West Sumatra  0.39** 
South Sumatra  0.35 
Lampung  0.08 
West Java  -0.02 
Central Java  0.67** 
Yogyakarta  0.67** 
East Java  0.53** 
Bali  0.26 
West Nusa Tenggara  -0.04 
South Kalimantan  0.29* 
South Sulawesi  1.04** 
Other Province  0.26 
Constant -0.69** 
Observations 2733 
R-squared 0.48 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
Controls for missing information related to repeating elementary, flooring, self-reported 
health, school type, residence at age 12, location of junior secondary school, vocational 
status of junior secondary school, and parental education. 
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Table 1: Marginal effects of determinants of school type  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Private 
secular  
Private 
Muslim  
Private 
Madrassah 
Private 
religious other 
Household wealth      
per capita expenditure  (log) & square -0.012* -0.005 0.003 0.003 
Tile floor  0.054* 0.014 -0.002 0.015 
Cement/Brick floor  0.037 0.019 -0.006 0.021* 
Lumber floor  0.008 -0.075* -0.010 0.042 
Bamboo Floor  -0.032 0.054 -0.011** -0.035** 
Dirt Floor  0.020 0.007 -0.002 0.032 
Academic achievement in elementary school     
Elementary test score & square -0.086** -0.074** -0.010** -0.017** 
Didn't repeat grade -0.010 -0.018 0.001 0.002 
Parental characteristics     
Mom attended junior secondary -0.023 -0.012 0.001 0.015 
Mom attended senior secondary -0.006 -0.018 -0.011** 0.030** 
Mom attended university -0.064 -0.055 -0.010** 0.063 
Dad attended junior secondary 0.039 -0.027 -0.005 0.001 
Dad attended senior secondary  0.002 -0.020 -0.010** 0.004 
Dad attended university -0.020 -0.013 -0.010** 0.005 
Observations  2733  2733  2733  2733 
Notes: Marginal effects from multinomial logit model estimated on junior high school subsample.  Omitted category is public school 
attendance. * indicates logit coefficients significant at 5%; ** at 1%.  Regression includes controls for missing flooring, missing parental 
education and other control variables listed in Appendix B. 
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Table 2: Effect of public school attendance on junior secondary school test score 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specification: OLS OLS OLS Family fixed 
effects 
Sample: Full sample Junior 
secondary 
Sample and 
Variables 
Elementary 
Sample and 
Variables 
Full sample  
Attended public junior 
secondary school 0.191 0.229 0.268 0.247 
 (0.029)** (0.038)** (0.043)** (0.090)** 
Observations 4383 2733 1948 883 
R-squared 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.75 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Regression includes other 
control variables listed in Appendix B. 
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Table 3: Correlates of local public school access 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Pct of schools  
public in district 
Pct of schools  
public in village 
Academic achievement in elementary school   
Elementary test score 0.150 1.167 
 (0.238) (0.652) 
Elementary test score , squared -0.251 -0.151 
 (0.180) (0.452) 
Didn't repeat grade 0.169 1.499 
 (0.654) (1.297) 
District characteristics   
Average district elementary test score -2.231 6.197 
 (3.071) (4.393) 
Avg district elem test score, squared  0.201 -13.432 
 (3.773) (6.298)* 
Parental characteristics   
Mom attended junior secondary 0.211 -3.399 
 (0.822) (1.864) 
Mom attended senior secondary 0.605 -3.293 
 (0.862) (3.070) 
Mom attended university 1.608 4.640 
 (1.375) (4.154) 
Dad attended junior secondary -2.161 -4.369 
 (0.758)** (1.768)* 
Dad attended senior secondary -0.422 -1.255 
 (0.730) (1.557) 
Dad attended university 0.696 8.715 
 (1.068) (2.710)** 
Observations 4383 2144 
R-squared 0.51 0.26 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Regression includes other 
control variables listed in Appendix B. 
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Table 4: Effect of public school attendance on test score  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: Full sample  Junior 
secondary 
sample 
Elementary 
school 
sample 
Full sample  Junior 
secondary 
sample  
Elementary 
school 
sample 
Instrumental 
variables: 
district % of 
schools 
public 
district % of 
schools 
public 
district % of 
schools 
public 
village % of 
schools 
public 
village % of 
schools 
public 
village % of 
schools 
public 
Attended public 
junior secondary 
school 
0.185 0.306 0.154 0.182 0.292 0.411 
 (0.298) (0.328) (0.375) (0.224) (0.265) (0.291) 
Observations 4383 2733 1948 2144 1529 1150 
R-squared 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.41 0.44 0.47 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Regression includes other control variables listed in 
Appendix B. 
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Table 5: Effect of school type on test score  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specification: OLS OLS OLS Fixed Effects 
Sample: Full sample  Junior secondary 
sample 
Elementary 
school sample  
Full sample  
Public Madrassah 0.054 -0.054 -0.117 0.116 
 (0.075) (0.080) (0.078) (0.185) 
Private :     
Secular -0.220 -0.236 -0.307 -0.282 
 (0.040)** (0.051)** (0.060)** (0.110)* 
Muslim -0.255 -0.322 -0.367 -0.291 
 (0.048)** (0.065)** (0.081)** (0.117)* 
Muslim Madrassah -0.104 -0.238 -0.271 -0.070 
 (0.060) (0.064)** (0.066)** (0.166) 
Other -0.036 0.018 -0.019 0.118 
 (0.073) (0.097) (0.110) (0.177) 
Observations 4383 2733 1948 1078 
R-squared 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.75 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Regression includes other 
control variables listed in Appendix B. 
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Table 6: Effect of school type by elementary school test quartile  
 
 Quartile of elementary school test score 
 0-25th 
percentile  
25th-50th 
percentile  
50-75th 
percentile  
75th-100th 
percentile  
Public Madrassah -0.053 0.348 -0.031 0.143 
 (0.099) (0.171)* (0.195) (0.164) 
Private:     
Secular -0.127 -0.056 -0.167 -0.395 
 (0.050)* (0.070) (0.076)* (0.181)* 
Muslim -0.107 -0.202 -0.139 -0.453 
 (0.068) (0.091)* (0.104) (0.174)** 
Muslim Madrassah -0.064 -0.106 0.050 -0.039 
 (0.085) (0.107) (0.147) (0.239) 
Other -0.138 0.014 0.119 0.244 
 (0.144) (0.198) (0.193) (0.199) 
Observations 4383 
R-squared 0.46 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Regression includes 
other control variables listed in Appendix B. 
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Table 7: Effect of school type excluding academic achievement in elementary school 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: Full Sample  Junior Secondary Sample  Elementary School Sample  
Specification: Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Included 
Public Madrassah -0.209 0.054 -0.326 -0.054 -0.393 -0.117 
 (0.082)* (0.075) (0.086)** (0.080) (0.091)** (0.078) 
Private :       
Secular -0.584 -0.220 -0.562 -0.236 -0.659 -0.307 
 (0.041)** (0.040)** (0.052)** (0.051)** (0.058)** (0.060)** 
Muslim -0.563 -0.255 -0.612 -0.322 -0.687 -0.367 
 (0.052)** (0.048)** (0.071)** (0.065)** (0.086)** (0.081)** 
Muslim Madrassah -0.376 -0.104 -0.506 -0.238 -0.534 -0.271 
 (0.062)** (0.060) (0.070)** (0.064)** (0.073)** (0.066)** 
Other -0.305 -0.036 -0.226 0.018 -0.232 -0.019 
 (0.090)** (0.073) (0.124) (0.097) (0.145) (0.110) 
Observations 4383 4383 2733 2733 1948 1948 
R-squared 0.30 0.45 0.34 0.48 0.38 0.52 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   Excludes/Includes indicates if elementary school test 
score and an indicator for grade repetition at the elementary level are in the specification.  Regression includes other control variables listed in 
Appendix B. 
  
 
